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EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW
IN MULTINATIONAL LITIGATION*
Tyler T. Ochoa**
Abstract
It is hornbook law that U.S. copyright law is not “extraterritorial,” i.e., that
it does not apply to conduct occurring in other countries. However, a
distinction must be drawn between purely extraterritorial conduct, which is
nonactionable, and conduct that crosses borders, so that at least a part of the
offense takes place within the United States. Despite the nominal rule against
extraterritoriality, U.S. courts have applied U.S. copyright law to a wide
range of multi-territorial infringement claims.

Both importation and

exportation of infringing copies or phonorecords are prohibited by statute,
and the distribution right has been interpreted broadly to apply to a foreign
seller who ships infringing goods into the United States. Although mere
“authorisation” in the United States that contributes to infringement
occurring entirely in another country is not actionable, if there is a
“predicate act” of infringement in the United States, courts are willing to
award the defendant’s profits resulting from that infringement, even if those
profits were earned overseas. Acts in another country that contribute to
infringement in the United States are actionable under U.S. law. And finally,
although courts are split over whether transmissions originating in the United
States must be received here to be actionable, courts agree that transmissions
originating in another country that are received in the United States are
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actionable under U.S. law, at least where the defendant intentionally
“targeted” those transmissions at the United States in some way. Taken
together, these doctrines afford copyright owners a wide range of options for
applying U.S. copyright law to multi-territorial infringement claims.
INTRODUCTION
The international intellectual property system is based on the twin principles
of territoriality and national treatment: each nation controls the protection and
use of intellectual property within its own borders,1 and each nation promises
to provide citizens and residents of other nations “treatment no less
favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the
protection of intellectual property.”2 But international trade in intellectual
property crosses borders with ease. Goods are produced in one country and
distributed in another country. Broadcast transmissions are sent from one
country and received in another country. Conduct in one country may
contribute to distribution of goods in another country. The Internet adds an
additional dimension to the problem: copies may be uploaded from one

1
See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, as amended
on Sept. 28, 1979 (hereinafter the Berne Convention), art. 5(2) (“the extent of protection, as
well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed
exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed.”), available at
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/283698 (last visited June 1, 2020). Cf. American Code Co.
v. Bensinger, 282 F. 829, 833 (2d Cir. 1922) (“The copyright laws of one country have no
extraterritorial operation, unless otherwise provided.”).
2
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter the TRIPS
Agreement), art. 3(1). The TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994.
The current text, as amended on 23 January 2017, is available at https://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/31bis_trips_01_e.htm (last visited June 1, 2020).
See also Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as amended on Sept. 28,
1979 (hereinafter the Paris Convention), art. 2(1) (“Nationals of any country of the Union
shall, as regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the
Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to [their]
nationals.”), available at https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/288514 (last visited June 1, 2020);
Berne Convention, art. 5(1) (“Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are
protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin,
the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals.”).
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country at the direction of someone in another country, stored on a server in
a third country, and transmitted to a fourth country. When such conduct
occurs without the consent of the right holder, which country’s laws apply to
the conduct?
This article will examine the United States’ approach to the choice of law
problem in one area of intellectual property law: copyright. After a brief
background section, the article will explore the application of U.S. law to four
categories of cases. First, cases involving importation and exportation of
physical goods will be examined.

Second, cases involving an alleged

domestic contribution to foreign infringement will be analysed. Third, cases
involving an alleged foreign contribution to domestic infringement will be
considered. Fourth, cases involving broadcast and internet transmissions
across borders will be analysed. Together, these four categories of cases
demonstrate that U.S. courts typically are willing to apply U.S. law to cases
having even a minimal connection with the United States, with little
consideration, if any, to the interests that other nations may have in applying
their own law to the dispute.
BACKGROUND
One potential solution to the choice-of-law problem in “multi-territorial
infringement” cases is harmonisation of substantive copyright law.3 If two
nations’ copyright laws are identical, then in theory it does not matter which
nation applies its law to the dispute. (Of course, there must still be some sort
of mechanism for determining the choice of forum and avoiding conflicting

3
This is the approach that has increasingly been taken in the European Union, where a series
of directives have reduced (but not eliminated) the disparities between the national copyright
laws of its 27 member states. See generally IRINI STAMATOUDI & PAUL TORREMANS, EU
COPYRIGHT LAW: A COMMENTARY (Elgar 2d ed. 2021)
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decisions.4) In the absence of such harmonisation, however, general
principles of tort law suggest that one should apply either the law of the place
where the wrongful act or omission occurs,5 or the law of the place where the
damage or harm occurs.6
Of course, determining where an act, omission, damage, or harm “occurs” for
an infringement of intangible property is such a difficult problem that the
most recent international agreement on choice of forum omitted intellectual
property altogether.7 One could argue, for example, that the “harm” or
“damage” always manifests itself in the country of the copyright owner’s
domicile, regardless of where the infringement took place. But the twin
principles of territoriality and national treatment suggest instead that
intellectual property should be governed by the law of the country in which
protection is claimed, that is, the country in which the alleged infringement
has taken place.8 Determining where an infringement occurred, in turn,
depends on the substantive law involved and the exclusive right that allegedly
has been violated.

4
In the European Union, for example, see EU Regulation 1215/2012 of 12 Dec. 2012 on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) [hereinafter EU Regulation 1215/2012].
5
See, e.g., Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [hereinafter Hague Convention on Recognition
of Judgments], art. 5(1)(j) (for “a non-contractual obligation arising from … damage to or
loss of tangible property,” recognizing judgments where “the act or omission directly causing
such harm occurred in the State of origin, irrespective of where that harm occurred”)
(emphasis added).
6
See, e.g., EC Regulation 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to NonContractual Obligations [hereinafter Rome II Regulation], art. 4(1) (“the law applicable to a
non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which
the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage
occurred”).
7
See Hague Convention on Recognition of Judgments, art. 1(m) (“This Convention shall not
apply to … intellectual property”).
8
This is the approach taken in the European Union. See Rome II Regulation, art. 8(1) (“The
law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of an intellectual
property right shall be the law of the country for which protection is claimed.”).
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In the United States, copyright law is governed by a federal statute: the
Copyright Act of 1976, as amended.9 Section 106 of the Copyright Act
provides copyright owners with five exclusive rights: (1) reproduction, (2)
adaptation, (3) public distribution, (4) public performance, and (5) public
display.10 Exceptions and limitations to those rights are provided in Sections
107 through 122.11 Infringement is defined as the unauthorised exercise of
any of those five rights.12
Unlike the U.S. Patent Act,13 the U.S. Copyright Act does not expressly limit
its applicability to the territory of the United States. Nonetheless, the Courts
of Appeals have uniformly held that “the United States copyright laws do not
reach acts of infringement that take place entirely abroad.”14 Thus, for
example, a claim that the State Bank of India infringed the plaintiff’s software

9

See 17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq.
17 U.S.C. § 106. A sixth exclusive right provides copyright owners of sound recordings
with the exclusive right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital
audio transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). Sound recordings (along architectural works and
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works) are not afforded a general right of public
performance. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (listing the categories of works to which the public
performance right applies).
11
Most of the exceptions and limitations are narrow and specific, applying only to specified
types of works and/or to specified exclusive rights. Two exceptions and limitations are of
general applicability: the fair use doctrine, which provides that “the fair use of a copyrighted
work … is not an infringement of copyright,” 17 U.S.C. § 107; and the first-sale doctrine,
also known as the doctrine of exhaustion, under which the owner of a particular copy may
resell or redistribute that copy without the authorization of the copyright owner, 17 U.S.C. §
109(a).
12
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 … is an infringer of the copyright”).
13
See 35 U.S.C. §154(a)(1) (granting “the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the
invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a process, … the right to exclude
others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing into
the United States, products made by that process”).
14
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathé Comms. Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 1994); accord,
Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Lights Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
See also Palmer v. Braun, 376 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004) (“it is only where an
infringing act occurs in the United States that the infringement is actionable under the federal
Copyright Act”); Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir.
1976) (“Copyright laws do not have extraterritorial application.”).
10
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by distributing it and using it at its branches in India had to be dismissed.15
However, “a distinction should be drawn between purely extraterritorial
conduct, which is itself nonactionable, and conduct that crosses borders, so
that at least a part of the offense takes place within the United States.”16 With
one exception, courts are left to work out whether the statute applies with
respect to such “multi-territorial infringement claims”17 on a case-by-case
basis.18
ANALYSIS OF U.S. CASE LAW
I. Importing and Exporting Infringing Goods
With regard to physical goods, the principles outlined above suggest that a
court should apply both the law of the country where the reproduction takes
place (to determine whether the reproduction was lawful), and the law of the
country where the distribution of copies takes place (to determine whether the
distribution was lawful). However, considering economic harm occurs only
when the goods are sold, as a practical matter, it may be expected that the
country into which the goods are imported will apply its own law. This is
especially true if the country has adopted a rule of domestic exhaustion, under

15

See Micro Data Base Systems, Inc. v. State Bank of India, 177 F. Supp. 2d 881, 886-87
(N.D. Ind. 2001). The infringement claim was allowed to proceed, however, with respect to
unauthorized use of the software at the Bank’s branch in New York. Id. at 887 n.2.
16
Litecubes, 523 F.3d at 1371, quoting 4 RAYMOND B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 17.02 (2008) (hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT).
17
Id.
18
Whether the statute encompasses such cross-border conduct is an element of the cause of
action and is properly raised on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or on a motion
for summary judgment, rather than on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Litecubes, 523 F.3d at 1366-68; Geophysical Service, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC
Geophysical Co., 850 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2017). In Palmer v. Braun, 376 F.3d at 1258,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the territorial limit was jurisdictional; but the Federal Circuit
in Litecubes disagreed on the basis of intervening authority of the U.S. Supreme Court. 523
F.3d at 1368.
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which the intellectual property owner may prohibit even lawfully made goods
from being imported and distributed without its authorisation.19
In the United States, the one statutory provision governing multi-territorial
infringement claims (conduct crossing borders) involves importation and
exportation. Section 602(a)(1) provides:
Importation into the United States, without the authority of the
owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords
of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is
an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or
phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section
501.20
And section 602(a)(2), added in 2008,21 provides:
Importation into the United States or exportation from
the United States, without the authority of the owner
of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords,
the making of which either constituted an infringement
of copyright, or which would have constituted an
infringement of copyright if this title had been
applicable, is an infringement of the exclusive right to

19

The issue of exhaustion of intellectual property rights proved so contentious that the TRIPS
Agreement left countries free to adopt any rule of exhaustion they wish, subject only to the
non-discrimination principles of national treatment and most-favored nation status. See
TRIPS Agreement, art. 6 (“subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this
Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property
rights.”).
20
17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1). This language was enacted in 1976 as subsection 602(a), and was
renumbered as subsection 602(a)(1) in 2008.
21
See Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008
(hereinafter “PRO-IP Act”), Pub. L. 110-403, Tit. I, § 105(b), 122 Stat. 4259.
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distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106,
actionable under sections 501 and 506.22
Together, these two sections could be read to suggest that importing or
exporting infringing copies violates section 602(a)(2), and is subject to both
civil and criminal penalties, while importing otherwise lawful copies or
phonorecords violates only section 602(a)(1), and is subject only to civil
penalties.23 Both sections, however, make unauthorised importation and
exportation “an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or
phonorecords under section 106.”24 And section 106 itself expressly says that
its exclusive rights are “subject to [the exceptions and limitations in] sections
107 through 122.”25 One of those limitations is the first-sale doctrine, or the
doctrine of exhaustion, which expressly allows “the owner the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title … to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord” without the
authorisation of the copyright owner, “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of
section 106(3).”26 Accordingly, in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’Anza
Research International, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that
former section 602(a) (now section 602(a)(1)) is subject to the first-sale
doctrine.27 And 15 years later, in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the
Court clarified that “the ‘first sale’ doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted

22
17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2). Section 501 stipulates a civil penalty while section 506 is a criminal
penalty.
23
“Copies” are defined as “material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is
fixed,” while “phonorecords” are defined as “material objects in which sounds, other than
those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
Note that exporting lawfully-made copies or phonorecords does not violate the statute at all.
24
17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1), (a)(2).
25
17 U.S.C. § 106.
26
17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
27
Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 144 (1998).
In so holding, the Court held that the phrase “to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession”
of a copy “includes the right to ship it to another person in another country.” 523 U.S. at 152.

97

work lawfully made abroad,”28 interpreting the phrase “lawfully made under
this title” to mean “‘in accordance with’ or ‘in compliance with’ the
Copyright Act” rather than “lawfully made in the United States.”29 Thus,
subsection 602(a)(1) is largely redundant; it only prohibits importation of
infringing copies and phonorecords (which is also prohibited by subsection
(a)(2)) and importation of lawful copies and phonorecords by those who have
such copies or phonorecords in their possession without obtaining ownership
of them.30
Moreover, some courts have interpreted subsection 106(3), which grants the
copyright owner the exclusive right to public distribution, in a way that
renders the importation prohibition in subsection 602(a)(2) somewhat
redundant. In Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light Products, Inc., for example,
the

court

considered

a

Canadian

company,

doing

business

as

GlowProducts.com, which “sold the accused products directly to customers
located in the United States and … would ship the products, f.o.b., from its
Canadian offices to its customers in the United States.”31 “‘F.o.b’ or ‘free on

28

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 525 (2013). Kirtsaeng involved a
graduate student from Thailand, studying in the United States, who asked friends and family
in Thailand to purchase copies of textbooks printed in Asia by the U.S. copyright owner and
to ship them to him in the United States, where he re-sold them at a substantial profit. Id. at
526-27.
29
Id. at 530. As a result, the Court subsequently vacated a previous opinion in which the
“Defendants purchased Foreign Editions of Plaintiffs’ books in India and resold them in the
United States,” because that case had held “the first sale doctrine does not apply to copies of
a copyrighted work manufactured abroad” in India. Pearson Education, Inc. v. Kumar, 721
F. Supp. 2d 166, 172, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Pearson Education, Inc. v. Yadav,
452 Fed. Appx. 11 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, vacated and remanded sub nom. Kumar v.
Pearson Education, Inc., 568 U.S. 1247 (2013), judgment vacated, 523 Fed. Appx. 13 (2d
Cir. 2013).
30
Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 534-35, 547; see also id. at 554-55 (Kagan, J., joined by Alito, J.,
concurring); id. at 565-67 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Kennedy and Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
31
Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light Products, Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
One of the defendant’s products in Litecubes was alleged to infringe both a U.S. patent and
a U.S. copyright registered to the plaintiff. The defendant did not contest the jury’s finding
that the product infringed both. Id. The other product was alleged to infringe only the U.S.
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board’ is ‘a method of shipment whereby goods are delivered at a designated
location, usually a transportation depot, at which legal title and thus the risk
of loss passes from seller to buyer.”32 In other words, GlowProducts
contended that it sold the infringing products in Canada, and that the buyers
located in the United States were the ones who “imported” the infringing
products into the United States, even though GlowProducts packaged the
goods, addressed the packages to buyers in the United States, and delivered
the packages to the post office or shipping company in Canada.33 Not
surprisingly, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument, holding that a “sale”
of the infringing items occurred in the United States when the items were
shipped directly to consumers in the United States, regardless of where title
was transferred as a formal matter.34 Although the court did not rely on the
fact that section 602 expressly makes importation (and exportation) a
violation of the distribution right,35 the ruling is consistent with the statute,
and with the holding in Quality King that the statutory phrase “to sell or

patent, and the jury’s determination that the product was infringing was upheld. Id. at 137274.
32
Id. at 1358 n.1, quoting MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp.,
420 F.3d 1369, 1374 n. 3 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
33
Alternatively, since patent and copyright are both strict liability statutes, GlowProducts
could have contended that the post office or shipping company was the person “importing”
the allegedly infringing products into the United States.
34
Litecubes, 523 F.3d at 1369-71 (patent); id. at 1371-72 (copyright). See also Liberty Toy
Co. v. Fred Silber Co., 149 F.3d 1183, 1998 WL 385469 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished disposition) (complaint alleged that defendant Maple Leaf Toy Co., based in Canada, committed
direct infringement in the United States when it sold allegedly infringing goods and shipped
them to U.S. buyer in Michigan; contract provided that seller retained title until payment was
made).
35
17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (unauthorized importation “is an infringement of the exclusive right
to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106”); 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2) (unauthorized
importation or exportation of infringing copies “is an infringement of the exclusive right to
distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106”).
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otherwise dispose of the possession” of a lawfully made copy “includes the
right to ship it to another person in another country.”36
The importation right also has been applied against a U.S. defendant who
ordered (and paid for) allegedly infringing copies made outside the United
States, on the grounds that the defendant caused the infringing copies to be
imported. In Geophysical Service, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co.,37
the parties were competitors in the business of providing seismic data to the
petroleum industry. Under Canadian law, the plaintiff was required to submit
copies of its seismic data maps to the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador
Offshore Petroleum Board, a government agency, which was required to keep
them confidential for a period of ten years. After the ten-year period expired,
defendant TGS ordered a copy of the maps from the Board, which made
copies and mailed them to TGS in Houston, at the defendant’s expense.38
When Geophysical sued TGS for infringement, TGS defended on the ground
that the copies were made outside the United States, and that the “act of state”
doctrine prohibits a United States court from reviewing the validity of the
actions of a foreign government.39
The Court of Appeals held that the “act of state” doctrine did not prohibit the
importation claim against TGS from going forward, because it did not require

36
Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998).
See also Palmer v. Braun, 376 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2004) (defendant “sold at least 25
copies of [the infringing work] to residents of the United States, and shipped these copies
from France to the United States.”); id. at 1258 (“the importation of the infringing work is an
infringing act occurring in the United States.”).
37
850 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2017).
38
Id. at 789.
39
Id. at 790. Cf. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (declining to
exercise jurisdiction over claims for infringement of foreign patents, even if related to the
U.S. patents at issue; “assuming arguendo that the act of state doctrine applies, the doctrine
would prevent our courts from inquiring into the validity of a foreign patent grant and require
our courts to adjudicate [foreign] patent claims regardless of validity or enforceability.”).
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the court to determine whether the Board acted illegally or invalidly, or was
an infringer: “even a ruling in favor of Geophysical will not invalidate any
action by the Canadian government, but only determine the effect of such
action on the right of United States citizens to import copies that a Canadian
agency made.”40 It further held that “[t]he inapplicability of the United States
Copyright Act to extraterritorial conduct provides no defense to
Geophysical’s importation claim.”41 It explained:
It is undisputed that TGS imported the copies of Geophysical’s
seismic lines into Houston, Texas by causing the CNLOP
Board to send them there. Therefore, the act of importation
occurred in the United States and is actionable under the
Copyright Act depending on the resolution of TGS’s first sale
defense.42
Consequently, the court remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether copies had been “lawfully made under this title” for purposes of
applying the first-sale doctrine.43 In a later appeal, the court upheld a finding
that Geophysical had granted the Board an implied license to reproduce and

40

850 F.3d at 797.
Id.
42
Id. at 797-98.
43
Id. at 798. In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the Court suggested in dicta that
whether the copies were “lawfully made” for purposes of applying the first-sale doctrine
should be determined according to the standards of U.S. law, rather than according to the law
of the place where the copies were made. 568 U.S. 519, 529-30 (2013). Nonetheless, the Fifth
Circuit declined to resolve the issue, instructing the district court to determine in the first
instance whether Canadian law or U.S. law applied to the reproduction. 850 F.3d at 795-96
& 798. On remand, the district court concluded that “a copy is lawful if it was made in the
United States in compliance with Title 17 or in a foreign country in a manner that would
comply with Title 17 if United States copyright law applied.” Geophysical Service, Inc. v.
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 125 U.S.P.Q.2d 1118, 1120 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2017).
41
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distribute the seismic maps, and it therefore affirmed the dismissal of the
action.44
The plaintiff in Geophysical also alleged that TGS was a contributory
infringer, because it induced or encouraged the Board to reproduce the works
in Canada and export them to the United States.45 The court rejected this
claim, holding that the reproduction and the exportation took place entirely
in Canada.46 This is inconsistent with Litecubes, which held that the Canadian
seller violated the “importation” right when it shipped infringing goods into
the United States, regardless of where title passes.47 It is also inconsistent with
statutory language indicating that it is the seller, rather than the buyer, who
violates the distribution right.48 This distinction is supported by case law
indicating that infringing goods cannot be seized from an innocent purchaser
who was not itself an infringer.49 Thus, Geophysical should have been
analysed as a case of contributory infringement, in which an American buyer
knowingly contributed to the infringing act of a foreign seller. As the Fifth
Circuit recognised, however, adjudicating the claim for contributory
infringement would have run afoul of the act of state doctrine, as it would

44

Geophysical Service, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 784 Fed. Appx. 253 (5th Cir.
2019).
45
Geophysical Service, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 850 F.3d 785, 799-800 (5th
Cir. 2017).
46
Id. at 800 (“The act of ‘exportation’ occurred entirely in Canada, and is beyond the reach
of the Copyright Act notwithstanding the destination.”).
47
Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light Products, Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
48
17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (granting the exclusive right “to distribute copies or phonorecords of
the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease,
or lending”) (emphasis added). Recall that importation “is an infringement of the exclusive
right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106.” 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)
(emphasis added).
49
Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Beseder, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1107 (D.
Ariz. 2006) (“Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Lindquist infringed any copyrights by
purchasing or possessing” the infringing sculpture); id. at 1112 (the Copyright Act “does not
permit the impoundment of infringing items in the hands of innocent purchasers who are not
themselves liable for infringement.”). Of course, a buyer who subsequently resells or
otherwise redistributes an infringing copy becomes an infringer.
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have required the court to determine whether the Canadian government
agency was a direct infringer.50 But in seeking to avoid the act of state
doctrine, the Fifth Circuit incorrectly held that it was the U.S. buyer of
infringing copies, and not the foreign seller, who violated the importation
right.
II. Foreign Contribution to Domestic Infringement
We next consider other conduct occurring outside the United States that
contributes to infringement occurring inside the United States. When the
direct infringement occurs in the United States, U.S. courts are willing to hold
foreign actors liable for contributing to that infringement, provided that the
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States and the usual
elements of contributory infringement are satisfied.51 As stated by one court:
[A] defendant can be liable for contributory infringement,
even for acts committed outside the United States, by inducing
or contributing to another’s infringement occurring in the
United States by supplying such other person with the
instruments for committing the infringement, provided the
defendant knew or should have known that the other would or
could reasonably be expected to commit the infringement.52

50

Cf. Geophysical, 850 F.3d at 797 (“Evaluating the first sale defense in connection with
TGS’s importation of copies made by the Board does not decide whether the CNLOP Board
is a copyright infringer, which would be a prohibited inquiry.”) (emphasis in original).
51
Contributory infringement generally requires three elements: 1) direct infringement; 2)
defendant must have knowledge of the direct infringement; and 3) defendant induced, caused
or materially contributed to the infringing conduct. PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §21:46.
52
Blue Ribbon Pet Prods., Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d 454, 462
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding Canadian company liable for ordering infringing products and
having them shipped to sister company in the United States, which sold the infringing
products here). See also Armstrong v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 628, 635-36
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This is consistent with the rule in patent law: although contributory
infringement in patent law expressly requires conduct in the United States,53
active inducement does not,54 and courts have allowed claims based on
overseas conduct that induced infringement in the United States.55 In patent
law, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that liability for active inducement
requires either actual knowledge of the infringement or wilful blindness; mere
negligence (or even recklessness) is not sufficient.56 This standard has been

(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (use in UK of allegedly infringing sample in a recording later distributed by
others in the United States); ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. Calif. Authority of Racing Fairs, 785
F. Supp. 854, 864 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (“it is possible for a defendant to commit acts outside the
United States sufficient to find it contributorily or vicariously liable for acts of infringement
committed by others within the United States”) (dicta), aff’d in part & rev’d in part on other
grounds, 3 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993); GB Marketing USA, Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen
GmbH & Co., 782 F. Supp. 763, 772-73 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (reproduction and sale of bottles
with allegedly infringing labels in Germany, with knowledge that bottles would be exported
to the United States and sold there).
53
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports
into the United States a component of a patented [invention], or a material or apparatus for
use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent,
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”) (emphasis added).
54
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as
an infringer.”).
55
Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., 909 F.3d 398, 408 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“Unlike direct infringement … , which must occur in the United States, liability for
induced infringement under § 271(b) can be imposed based on extraterritorial acts, provided
that the patentee proves the defendant possessed the requisite knowledge and specific intent
to induce direct infringement in the United States.”); Merial, Ltd. v. Cipla, Ltd., 681 F.3d
1283, 1302–03 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“where a foreign party, with the requisite knowledge and
intent, employs extraterritorial means to actively induce acts of direct infringement that occur
within the United States, such conduct is [actionable] under § 271(b).”); DSU Medical Corp.
v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (approving jury instruction);
Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 1975) (“‘active
inducement’ may be found in events outside the United States if they result in a direct
infringement here.”).
56
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB, S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 759-60 (2011) (defendant
“argues that active inducement liability under § 271(b) requires more than deliberate
indifference to a known risk … [and that] actual knowledge of the patent is needed.”); id. at
766 (“We agree that deliberate indifference to a known risk that a patent exists is not the
appropriate standard,” but approving willful blindness); id. at 769 (“A court can properly find
willful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew. By
contrast, a reckless defendant is one who merely knows of a substantial and unjustified risk
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adopted for contributory infringement in copyright law.57 Hence, the quote in
the indented paragraph above should be modified to remove the “or should
have known” language.
Because the doctrine of contributory infringement requires knowledge of the
infringing activity (including, one presumes, the location of the infringing
activity), it is fair to hold a foreign actor that knowingly contributes to a direct
infringement in the United States to the standards of U.S. copyright law.
III. Domestic Contribution to Foreign Infringement
The converse situation involves conduct occurring within the United States
that contributes to infringement occurring outside the United States. If a
domestic actor knowingly contributes to a direct infringement in a foreign
country, it is fair to hold that domestic actor to the standards of foreign
copyright law. Many U.S. courts, however, have tended to go only halfway,
dismissing the claim under U.S. law without considering whether the claim
should be heard under foreign law. In response, other U.S. courts have
overcorrected by applying U.S. law whenever there is a “predicate act” of
infringement in the United States, even when the claim should be analysed
under foreign law. The result is that U.S. courts tend to apply U.S. law to the
entire dispute or not at all, instead of considering the middle ground of
applying foreign law to domestic conduct that contributes to an overseas
infringement.

of such wrongdoing, and a negligent defendant is one who should have known of a similar
risk but, in fact, did not.”).
57
See, e.g., BMG Rights Mgmt. (US), LLC v. Cox Comms., Inc., 881 F.3d 293, 308-10 (4th
Cir. 2018) (requiring actual knowledge or willful blindness; “negligence is insufficient”); see
also Luvdarts, LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 710 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2013)
(requiring actual knowledge or willful blindness, without discussing the issue); cf. Erickson
Prods., Inc. v. Kast, 921 F.3d 822, 831-32 (9th Cir. 2017) (“even if the ‘should have known’
instruction was erroneous,” defendant “did not raise this objection at trial”).
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The leading case in the United States is Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathé
Communications Co.58 Subafilms produced the movie Yellow Submarine,
which was released in 1968 by MGM. Two decades later, MGM released the
movie on home video in the United States, and it licensed Warner Brothers to
release the movie on home video outside the United States. Subafilms sued
both MGM and Warner for infringement, and a special master found that their
use was unauthorised, because the 1967 licensing agreement between
Subafilms and MGM did not include home video distribution. The district
court awarded 2.2 million in compensatory damages, half for the domestic
distribution and half for the international distribution.59
The defendants appealed the award for international distribution on the
ground that U.S. copyright law did not extend to foreign sales. With regard to
the foreign sales, the only conduct that had occurred in the United States was
execution of the licensing agreement that “authorised” Warner to distribute
the film on home video outside the United States.60 However, section 106
grants to copyright owners “the exclusive rights to do and to authorise any of
the following” acts, including reproduction and distribution to the public.61
Based on this language, a previous case had held that domestic authorisation
of foreign infringing activity was itself an actionable infringement under
United States law.62 After a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed based on the

58

24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Id. at 1089.
60
Id. at 1089 & n.3.
61
17 U.S.C. § 106 (emphasis added).
62
Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440, 1442-43 (9th Cir.
1986).
59
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earlier case, the full court granted rehearing en banc to reconsider its previous
holding.63
The en banc court held that domestic authorisation of foreign activity was not
sufficient to constitute either direct or contributory infringement under United
States law.64 It reasoned as follows: first, “the addition of the words ‘to
authorise’ in the [1976] Copyright Act was not meant to create a new form of
liability for ‘authorisation’ … but was intended [only] to invoke the preexisting doctrine of contributory infringement.”65 Second, there can be no
liability for contributory infringement without proof of direct infringement.66
Third,
Given the undisputed axiom that United States copyright law
has no extraterritorial application, it would seem to follow
necessarily that a primary activity outside the boundaries of
the United States, not constituting an infringement cognisable
under the Copyright Act, cannot serve as the basis for holding

63

In the thirteen United States Courts of Appeals, appeals are normally decided by panels of
three judges. When a court grants rehearing en banc, all of the non-recused active judges on
that court decide the case, except in the Ninth Circuit. Because the Ninth Circuit is so large
(28 active judges), in the Ninth Circuit a case in which rehearing en banc is granted is decided
by a panel of 11 judges (the Chief Judge, plus ten that are randomly selected). See 9th Cir.
R. 35-3.
64
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathé Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“we conclude that there can be no liability under the United States copyright laws for
authorizing an act that itself could not constitute infringement of rights secured by those laws,
and that wholly extraterritorial acts of infringement are not cognizable under the Copyright
Act.”) (emphasis in original).
65
Id. at 1092. In so holding, the court relied on a statement in the legislative history that
explained: “Use of the phrase ‘to authorize’ is intended to avoid any questions as to the
liability of contributory infringers.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674.
66
Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1092-93. Accord, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371
F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir. 2004); DSC Comms. Corp. v. Pulse Comms. Corp., 170 F.3d 1354,
1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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liable under the Copyright Act one who is merely related to
that activity within the United States.67
Accordingly, the court concluded that “the mere authorisation of acts of
infringement that are not cognizable under the United States copyright laws
because they occur entirely outside of the United States does not state a claim
for infringement under the Copyright Act.”68
Two district courts in other circuits have expressly disagreed with Subafilms
on this point.69 In Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., for example, producer Curb,
who held the rights to reproduce and distribute certain sound recordings in
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, authorised the
distribution of those recordings in several other countries.70 The court rejected
Subafilms and held that “authorising the distribution of the recordings for sale
to a worldwide public” violated U.S. law.71 It explained:
[P]iracy has changed since the Barbary days. Today,
the raider need not grab the bounty with his own hands;
he need only transmit his go-ahead by wire or telefax
to start the presses in a distant land. Subafilms ignores
this economic reality, … and transforms infringement
of the authorisation right into a requirement of
domestic presence by a primary infringer. Under this
view, a phone call to Nebraska results in liability; the

67

Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1093, quoting 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.04 (1993).
Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1099.
69
See Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Expediters
Int’l of Wash., Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Mgmt. Servs., 995 F. Supp. 468, 476-77 (D.N.J.
1998).
70
Curb, 898 F. Supp. at 592 (listing Austria, Finland, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, and
South Africa), id. at 594 (listing Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand).
71
Id. at 596.
68
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same phone call to France results in riches. In a global
marketplace, it is literally a distinction without a
difference.72
Despite these dissenting voices, however, Subafilms’ holding that domestic
authorisation of extraterritorial conduct does not violate U.S. law is widely
accepted.73 The unstated implication is that the claim of domestic contribution
to infringement occurring in another country should be heard in the country
where the direct infringement occurred, under that country’s laws.74
By contrast, however, there are a number of cases that distinguish Subafilms
and apply U.S. law to foreign infringements under the so-called “predicate
act” doctrine.
The predicate act doctrine originated in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp.75 Defendants were found to have infringed the plaintiffs’ play
Dishonored Lady in making and exhibiting the motion picture Letty Lynton.76

72

Id. at 595.
See, e.g., Geophysical Service, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 850 F.3d 785, 799
(5th Cir. 2017) (“In short, we follow the holding of the Ninth Circuit in Subafilms. Where a
copyright plaintiff claims contributory infringement predicated on direct infringement that
occurred entirely extraterritorially, the plaintiff has stated no claim.”); Datacarrier, S.A .v.
WOCCU Servs. Group, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1084 (W.D. Wisc. 2016) (“This court
will follow Subafilms, like the majority of courts to consider the issue.”); Rundquist v.
Vapiano SE, 798 F. Supp. 2d 102, 128-29 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Notwithstanding the criticism of
the results, the Subafilms ruling remains the majority rule”); Armstrong v. Virgin Records,
Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Subafilms “is now generally accepted”); 2
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, § 25:87 (2019) (approving Subafilms and
rejecting Curb).
74
Because there is no claim under U.S. law, few courts have considered whether a claim for
foreign infringement could be heard in a U.S. court against a defendant domiciled in the
United States, while still applying foreign law.
75
106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied in relevant part, 308 U.S. 617 (1939), cert. granted
on other grounds, 308 U.S. 545 (1939), and affirmed, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
76
See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
669 (1936).
73
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Defendants objected to inclusion of “the profits made from exhibiting the
infringing picture outside the United States.”77 The court responded:
At first blush it would indeed seem that these should be
excluded. […] However, exhibition is not the only act
forbidden by the [1909] Copyright Act; Section 1(d) gives to
the author the exclusive right, not only to perform a dramatic
work, but “to make … any transcription or record thereof …
from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner … be
… reproduced.” [Defendants] made the negatives in this
country, or had them made here, and shipped them abroad,
where the positives were produced and exhibited. The
negatives were “records” from which the work could be
“reproduced”, and it was a tort to make them in this country.
The plaintiffs acquired an equitable interest in them as soon as
they were made, which attached to any profits from their
exploitation, whether in the form of money remitted to the
United States, or of increase in the value of shares of foreign
companies held by the defendants. […] [A]s soon as any of the
profits so realized took the form of property whose situs was
in the United States, our law seized upon them and impressed
them with a constructive trust, whatever their form.78
In Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O’Reilly, however, the court rejected a
claim of profits from public performances in Canada of songs from the
musical Jesus Christ Superstar, even though “the defendants assembled and

77

106 F.2d at 52.
Id. (bracketed insertions and ellipses added). See also Famous Music Corp. v. Seeco
Records, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 560, 568-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (infringing recordings made in
United States were shipped abroad and used to make phonograph records in other countries).
78
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arranged in the United States all the necessary elements for the performances
in Canada, and then simply travelled to Canada to complete the
performances.”79 The court explained that, unlike in Sheldon, the Canadian
performances were not enabled by any act of infringement in the United
States.80 “It is only when the type of infringement permits further
reproduction abroad that its exploitation abroad becomes the subject of a
constructive trust.”81
Although Sheldon and Stigwood were both based on the language of the 1909
Copyright Act, courts applying the 1976 Act adopted the same reasoning.
Thus, in Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd., a copyrighted poster was
reproduced in an Israeli newspaper, which also distributed some copies in the
United States.82 Based on Stigwood, the court held that liability depended on
whether a “predicate act” of infringement had occurred in the United States:
As the applicability of American copyright laws over the
Israeli newspapers depends on the occurrence of a predicate
act in the United States, the geographic location of the illegal
reproduction is crucial. If the illegal reproduction of the poster
occurred in the United States and then was exported to Israel,
the magistrate properly could include damages accruing from
the Israeli newspapers. If, as appellants assert, this predicate

79

530 F.2d 1096, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1976). Presumably, the “arrangements” referred to as
occurring in the U.S. included casting, rehearsals, and contracts for the performances in
Canada.
80
Id. at 1101 (“The steps taken by the defendants preliminary to the Canadian performances
were certainly not the ‘manufacture’ of anything, nor were the performances ‘records’ from
which the work could be ‘reproduced.’”).
81
530 F.2d at 1101.
82
843 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994).

111

act occurred in Israel, American copyright laws would have no
application to the Israeli newspapers.83
Although the defendants contended that the initial copying (photographing a
copy of the poster seen “on an office wall”) had occurred in Israel, they failed
to submit any admissible evidence to support the claim.84 Based in part on the
defendants’ dilatory and evasive responses to discovery, the court concluded
instead that this “predicate act” had occurred in the United States.85
The Ninth Circuit has adopted the “predicate act” of infringement doctrine,
with a twist. In Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd.,86
news footage recorded by LANS was broadcast, with authorisation, on the
Today show on NBC. Pursuant to preexisting contracts, the Today show was
transmitted to both Visnews and the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) in
New York, each of which made a copy on videotape. Visnews (a joint venture
between NBC, Reuters, and the BBC) transmitted its videotaped copy to its
subscribers in Europe and Africa; while EBU transmitted its videotaped copy
to Reuters in London, which in turn re-transmitted the program to its
subscribers.87 Summarising Sheldon and Update Art, the court remarked that
“[r]ecovery of damages arising from overseas infringing uses was allowed
because the predicate act of infringement occurring within the United States
enabled further reproduction abroad.”88 The plaintiff sought to apply this rule:

83

Id. at 73.
Id.
85
Id. It is sometimes asserted that the court found that the Israeli newspapers themselves
were reproduced in the United States. A careful reading of the opinion reveals that this is not
the case; instead, the “predicate act” was only the initial reproduction of the poster by
defendants.
86
149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998).
87
Id. at 990.
88
Id. at 992.
84
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While the extraterritorial damages resulted from Reuters’s
overseas dissemination of the works received by satellite
transmissions from Visnews and EBU, those transmissions
were made possible by the infringing acts of copying in New
York. The satellite transmissions, thus, were merely a means
of shipping the unlicensed footage abroad for further
dissemination.89
The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that “LANS is entitled to recover damages
flowing from exploitation abroad of the domestic acts of infringement
committed by defendants.”90
On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment to the
defendants, holding that LANS could only recover any profits the defendants
had made from the infringement, rather than its actual damages (i.e., lost
licensing fees for overseas use); and that LANS had failed to prove that
Reuters and Visnews had earned any profits from the infringement,
presumably because they earned the same amount of money from their
subscribers regardless of whether the Today show contained infringing
content or not.91 On appeal, a different panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It
first noted that both Sheldon and Update Art concerned an award of
defendants’ profits, not actual damages.92 It then reasoned that Subafilms
“counsel[s] a narrow application … of the Sheldon exception to the general
rule. In particular, the Sheldon constructive trust rationale includes a territori-

89

Id.
Id.
91
Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 340 F.3d 926, 928 (9th Cir.
2003).
92
Id. at 929-30. “As Sheldon considered only an award of profits, it is counterintuitive that a
court applying Sheldon’s rationale, but using the word ‘damages’ as the Reuters III court did,
was referring consciously to ‘actual damages’ as opposed to ‘profits.’” Id. at 929.
90
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al connection that preserves consistency with Congress’s decision to keep the
copyright laws … territorially confined.”93 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that
the “predicate act” doctrine is limited to a recovery of foreign profits enabled
by a domestic act of infringement, and that it does not allow the recovery of
extraterritorial damages more generally.94
The Fourth Circuit has also adopted the “predicate act” doctrine, but in doing
so it extended the doctrine far beyond what the Second and Ninth Circuits had
approved. In Tire Engineering & Distribution, LLC v. Shandong Linglong
Rubber Co., defendants copied the plaintiff’s blueprints for mining tires,
modified them in the United States (creating derivative works), used the
modified blueprints to manufacture tires in China, and sold the tires to
plaintiff’s foreign customers.95 The Fourth Circuit affirmed an award of $26
million for defendants’ profits from the sales of tires in foreign countries,
based on the “predicate act” doctrine.96 This award was improper for two
reasons. First, it was based on the sales of tires, rather than on the value of the
blueprints. Under the U.S. Copyright Act, tires are “useful articles”;97 and
while blueprints are copyrightable, “copyright in a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work, portraying a useful article as such, does not extend to the

93

Id. at 931.
340 F.3d at 931-32.
95
682 F.3d 292, 298-99 (4th Cir. 2012). Although the appellate opinion does not expressly
state that all of the sales took place in foreign countries, one of the lower court opinions does:
“[t]here was no evidence that any of these customers were located inside the United States.”
In re Outsidewall Tire Litigation, 2010 WL 11474982, at *6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 17, 2010).
96
682 F.3d at 308. In so holding, it cited only the Ninth Circuit’s initial opinion in LANS, and
not the later opinion limiting the doctrine to awards of defendant’s profits. Id. at 307-08.
Nonetheless, the award it affirmed was based on the defendant’s profits from the sales of
tires.
97
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”).
94
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manufacture of the useful article itself.”98 “The proper award should have
been limited to licensing fees for use of the blueprints to make the tires,”
rather than profits from the sale of the tires.99 Second, the award was based
solely on two “predicate acts” that occurred outside the limitations period
(more than three years before the complaint was filed): reproduction of the
blueprints and the preparation of modified blueprints based on them.100 If the
rationale of the “predicate act” doctrine is that the foreign profits are an
appropriate remedy for a completed act of domestic infringement, then the
award should have been zero, because all of the acts of domestic infringement
fell outside of the limitations period. Although the foreign sales took place
within the limitations period, those sales were not independently actionable
under U.S. law. The Fourth Circuit erroneously treated the “predicate act”
doctrine as an excuse for extending the territorial reach of the statute, rather
than as a remedy for a domestic infringing act.
Scholars on both sides of the extraterritorial debate have criticised the
“predicate act” doctrine as drawing an untenable line. Jane Ginsburg argues
that it “does not make sense” that “everything turns on the creation of a

98

H.R. Rep. 94-1476, at 105 (1976). This statement comes from the legislative history, as
the statute itself merely preserves preexisting case law to that effect. See 17 U.S.C. § 113(b)
(“This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful article
as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of the
useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such works under the law … in effect on
December 31, 1977.”). See also Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002,
1010 (2017) (although “a cardboard model of a car … could itself be copyrightable, it would
not give rise to any rights in the useful article that inspired it.”); id. at 1033 (Breyer, J., joined
by Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The law has long recognized that drawings or photographs of
real-world objects are copyrightable as drawings or photographs, but the copyright does not
give protection against others making the underlying useful objects.”) (citing §113(b) and
quoting the House Report).
99
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §25:92.50.
100
In re Outsidewall Tire Litigation, 748 F. Supp. 2d 543, 553-54 (E.D. Va. 2010), affirmed
in relevant part, reversed in part and remanded sub nom. Tire Eng’g & Dist., LLC v.
Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 308-09 (4th Cir. 2012).
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material copy within U.S. borders.”101 She would allow extraterritorial
damages to be recovered whenever any acts connected to the foreign
infringement occurred in the United States, including mere “authorisation,”
as in Subafilms.102 William Patry agrees that the distinction does not make
sense; but he maintains that damages from extraterritorial infringement can
never be recovered under U.S. law, even if there has been a “predicate act” of
infringement in the United States.103 Instead, he argues, damages from
extraterritorial infringement can only be recovered under foreign law.104
The author agrees with Patry that there is nothing in the U.S. Copyright Act
that expressly rebuts the strong presumption against extraterritoriality.105
Indeed, the 2008 amendment to address cases of exportation (where copies
are reproduced in the United States, exported and then sold overseas) carries
with it the negative implication that the “predicate act” doctrine is
overbroad.106 Nonetheless, the doctrine seems firmly entrenched in U.S.
jurisprudence. If courts are going to use the “predicate act” doctrine, then the
restriction by the Ninth Circuit makes sense. “Actual damages” are a legal

101
Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality and Multi-territoriality in Copyright Infringement,
37 Va. J. Int’l L. 587, 598 (1997).
102
Id. at 597-98.
103
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §25:92 (“Accordingly where a work is initially infringed overseas
[sic; should be “in the United States”] and then additional acts are committed overseas
facilitated by the U.S. infringement, there is no liability for the overseas acts under U.S. law.”)
(emphasis added). My bracketed correction is confirmed by the emphasized language, and
by the title of the sub-chapter, which is “A Work is Infringed Initially in the United States
and Then Additional Acts are Committed Overseas, Facilitated by the U.S. Infringement.”
(Patry also confirmed the correction in an email exchange, on file with the author.) In Patry’s
view, Update Art was overruled sub silentio by the U.S. Supreme Court, and should not be
followed. PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §25:91; see also id. at §25:89 (criticizing Sheldon), §25:90
(criticizing Update Art).
104
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §25:88. This does not mean, however, that such claims can only
be heard in foreign courts. Patry agrees that U.S. courts can hear foreign infringement claims
if they are related to claims for infringement occurring in the U.S. PATRY ON COPYRIGHT
§25:83.
105
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §25:86, §25:91.
106
See 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2).
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remedy, whereas a “constructive trust” is an equitable remedy that often
accompanies an accounting of the defendant’s profits, which is also an
equitable remedy.107 Thus, perhaps it is reasonable to utilise a constructive
trust in measuring the “profits of the infringer that are attributable to the
[domestic act of] infringement.”108
The “predicate act” doctrine gives copyright owners a great advantage in the
digital age. Because computers must create temporary versions of digitally
encoded works in “random access memory” (or RAM) in order to function,109
it frequently will be the case that at least one such version will be created on
a computer in the United States as a preliminary step toward committing
infringement elsewhere. Such RAM versions are considered “copies” or
“phonorecords” if they subsist “for a period of more than transitory
duration.”110 The reproduction right grants copyright owners the exclusive
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See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002)
(restitution is sometimes a legal remedy, but it is an equitable remedy, “ordinarily in the form
of a constructive trust …, where money or property identified as belonging in good
conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the
defendant’s possession.”); id. at 214 n.2 (“an accounting for profits [is] a form of equitable
restitution …. If, for example, a plaintiff is entitled to a constructive trust on particular
property held by the defendant, he may also recover profits produced by the defendant’s use
of that property, even if he cannot identify a particular res containing the profits sought to be
recovered.”).
108
17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
109
See Cartoon Network, L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 128 n.1 (2d Cir. 2008).
110
17 U.S.C. § 101 (“‘Copies’ are material objects … in which a work is fixed by any method
now known or later developed”); id. (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression
when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord … is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration.”); see also MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,
518 (9th Cir. 1993); Stenograph LLC v. Bossard Assocs.., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101-02 (D.C.
Cir. 1998); cf. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127-29 (distinguishing MAI and holding that a
stream of data embodied in RAM for no more than 1.2 seconds was only of “transitory
duration”).
If the work is a sound recording, then the material object in which the work is fixed is
considered to be a “phonorecord” instead of a “copy.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“‘Phonorecords’ are
material objects in which sounds … are fixed by any method now known or later developed”).
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right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords.”111 Thus,
copying data into RAM is an infringement of the reproduction right; and
under the “predicate act” doctrine, if one or more “RAM” copies are made in
the United States, profits from the subsequent reproduction and use of such
copies overseas may be recovered under U.S. law.112 Recently, however, two
Courts of Appeals have refused to extend U.S. law to foreign infringements
where the only “predicate acts” alleged were downloading content from a
computer based in the United States to a computer located in a foreign
country, despite the possibility that temporary “RAM” copies were made in
the United States in the course of such downloading.113
IV. Transmissions
Broadcast transmissions made in one country can often be received in another
country (with or without the aid of retransmission).114 The Berne Convention
requires countries to provide authors with “the exclusive right of authorising
… the broadcasting of their works or the communication thereof to the public
by any other means of wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or images” and “any

111

17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
Cf. Elsevier, Ltd. v. Chitika, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 2d 398, 402-03 (D. Mass. 2011) (allegation
that a citizen and resident of India uploaded infringing copies of plaintiff’s books in India
that were downloaded in U.S. “does not constitute an act of direct infringement occurring
entirely within the United States,” so predicate act doctrine did not apply; but declining to
dismiss infringement claim because “factual issues involving the structure of the Internet and
the locus of the infringing activity remain.”).
113
See IMAPizza, LLC v. At Pizza, Ltd., 965 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (alleged copycat
restaurant did not violate U.S. Copyright Act because reproduction occurred entirely in the
United Kingdom; allegation that copyrighted photographs were downloaded from servers
located in the U.S. was not a domestic act of infringement, because “copies” were fixed on
the receiving end); Superama Corp. v. Tokyo Broadcasting System Television, Inc., 830 Fed.
App’x 821 (9th Cir. 2020) (complaint alleging that Japanese defendant downloaded
recording of a U.S. sumo tournament and broadcast it in Japan was properly dismissed;
downloading does not occur where the material is stored, but where the downloader is
located).
114
Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“To ‘transmit’ a performance or display is to communicate it by any
device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they
are sent.”).
112
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communication to the public by wire or by rebroadcasting of the broadcast of
the work” by a different party.115 The United States, however, did not adopt
this language; instead, it grants authors the exclusive right “to perform the
copyrighted work publicly,”116 and it defines “publicly” to include four types
of performances (arranged in two clauses):
(1) to perform or display [the work] at a place open to the public
or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered;
or (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or
display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the
public, by means of any device or process, whether the members
of the public capable of receiving the performance or display
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same
time or at different times.117
For purposes of the territoriality principle, the question becomes: does the
resulting performance occur in the country from which the transmission
originates, or the country in which the transmission is received, or both? As
the cases below demonstrate, with one notable exception, U.S. courts have
applied the law of the country in which the transmission is received.
In Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. General Instrument Corp.,118 plaintiff had
licensed the exclusive right to broadcast certain motion pictures in Western
Canada, while Showtime had licensed the right to broadcast many of the same
motion pictures in the United States. Showtime transmitted its programs by
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Berne Convention, art. 11bis(1) & (2).
17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
117
17 U.S.C. § 101.
118
69 F.3d 381 (9th Cir. 1995).
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satellite to subscribers, but the “footprint” of the satellite also could be
received in Canada. General Instrument made and sold hardware and software
to scramble the transmission, and a decoder device to allow authorised
subscribers to descramble the transmission. The complaint alleged that
General sold “decoders in the U.S. and Canada in numbers far in excess of
any authorised users and to people whom it knew or had reason to know were
using the decoders for the purpose of receiving American [subscription] TV
programming in Allarcom’s territory.”119 The amended complaint stated only
state-law causes of action, and the defendants moved to dismiss on the ground
that the action was pre-empted by Copyright Act.
The district court granted the motion, reasoning that the U.S. Copyright Act
applied either “if part of an act of infringement begins in the United States,
and is completed in a foreign jurisdiction, or if a person in the United States
authorises an infringement that takes place in a foreign jurisdiction.”120 The
Ninth Circuit explained that in Subafilms, “[w]e held that in order for U.S.
copyright law to apply, at least one alleged infringement must be completed
entirely within the United States, and that mere authorisation of
extraterritorial infringement was not a completed act of infringement in the
United States.”121 It then summarily reversed, saying:
In this case, defendants either initiated a potential
infringement in the United States by broadcasting the
Showtime signal, which contained copyrighted material, or
defendants authorised people in Canada to engage in
infringement. In either case, the potential infringement was

119

Id. at 384.
Id. at 387.
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Id.
120

120

Indian J. Intell. Prop. L.

only completed in Canada once the signal was received and
viewed. Accordingly, U.S. copyright law did not apply, and
therefore did not pre-empt Allarcom’s state law claims.122
It should be noted, however, that Showtime was authorised to transmit the
copyrighted material in the United States, so the transmission itself could not
be infringing. The only possible basis for liability was contributory
infringement in selling decoder boxes, and both the sales and the use of those
boxes (and therefore the viewing) took place in Canada. Thus, the court was
correct in holding that U.S. law did not apply. It is far from clear, however,
that the court meant to preclude application of U.S. law to unauthorised
transmissions containing copyrighted material originating in the United
States.
The Second Circuit reached the opposite result in National Football League
v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, in which PrimeTime held a statutory license
to retransmit network programming of NFL games by satellite to “subscribers
in United States households that do not have adequate over-the-air broadcast
reception from primary television stations, i.e., ‘unserved’ households.”123
PrimeTime, however, also retransmitted the games to subscribers in
Canada.124 The question was whether doing so violated any provision of U.S.
copyright law. The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court ruling that
PrimeTime’s transmission from the United States to the satellite was itself a
public performance:
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Id.
211 F.3d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 2000). See 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(2)(B) (authorizing “secondary
transmissions to unserved households”); § 119(d)(10) (defining “unserved household”).
124
Again, the single retransmission originated from the United States, but the signal could be
received in Canada, so one assumes PrimeTime made the games available to Canadian
subscribers by selling or renting satellite dishes and decoder boxes to those subscribers.
123
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We believe the most logical interpretation of the Copyright
Act is to hold that a public performance or display includes
each step in the process by which a protected work wends its
way to its audience. Under that analysis, it is clear that
PrimeTime’s uplink transmission of signals captured in the
United States is a step in the process by which NFL’s protected
work wends its way to a public audience. In short, PrimeTime
publicly displayed or performed material in which the NFL
owns the copyright. Because PrimeTime did not have
authorization to make such a public performance, PrimeTime
infringed the NFL’s copyright.125
This holding is problematic, because PrimeTime’s retransmission ostensibly
was authorised pursuant to a statutory license.126 The court should have
analysed the case as one of contributory infringement: PrimeTime contributed
to an infringement in Canada by selling or renting satellite dishes and decoder
boxes to subscribers in Canada. If one analyses the case this way, it is clear
that the action should have been resolved under Canadian law, not under U.S.
law.
This analysis becomes even clearer when we consider the converse of the
situations in Allarcom and PrimeTime 24. In Los Angeles News Service v.
Conus Communications Co., defendant Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
(“CBC”) allegedly broadcast plaintiff’s news footage in Canada without
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211 F.3d at 13.
Patry nonetheless approves of the holding, on the ground that a single transmission can be
“simultaneously infringing and non-infringing,” depending on the content and the viewer.
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §25:98. While the statute and legislative history indicates that
Congress did intend for intermediate transmissions to be treated as public performances, H.R.
Rep. 94-1476, at 63-64 (1976), there is no indication that Congress intended to regulate such
performances when the “public” that received them was located outside the United States.
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authorisation.127 Its broadcast transmissions were received in border areas of
the United States.128 The district court denied CBC’s motion to dismiss,
holding that if the footage was broadcast without authorisation, “an act of
infringement was committed within the United States when the Canadian
transmission was received and viewed here.”129 Likewise, in Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, defendants in Canada received
broadcast transmissions from the United States, “converted these television
signals into computerised data and streamed them over the Internet from a
website called iCraveTV.com.”130 As in Conus, the court held that “although
the streaming of the plaintiffs’ programming originated in Canada, acts of
infringement were committed within the United States when United States
citizens received and viewed defendants’ streaming of the copyrighted
materials.”131 In both cases, as in Allarcom, it was the place where the
transmissions were received that was determinative.132

127

969 F. Supp. 579, 582 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
Id. There was evidence that in 1992–1993, “an average of 7,814 households in the United
States received CBC’s broadcast signal and actually watched CBC.” Id.
129
Id. at 584; see also id. at 583 (“Plaintiffs claim direct acts of infringement—not merely
authorization—by the display of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works on American television
sets.”).
In holding so, the district court relied on its own prior opinion in Los Angeles News Service
v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (C.D. Cal. 1996), which was later
reversed and remanded by the Ninth Circuit based on the “predicate act” of infringement
doctrine. 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998). If the defendants in Reuters had transmitted the works
overseas without having made videotape copies or unauthorized transmissions in the United
States, then presumably the Ninth Circuit would have followed Allarcom and found no
liability.
130
53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1831, 1832 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
131
Id. at 1835.
132
One could distinguish the two cases, however, on the ground that in iCraveTV, there was
good evidence that the defendant was “targeting” the United States; whereas in Conus, the
CBC credibly alleged that “any allegedly infringing activity in the United States was
unintended and unavoidable.” 969 F. Supp. at 584. Because the complaint in Conus alleged
direct infringement, however, rather than contributory infringement, the court held that intent
was immaterial. Id.
128
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The D.C. Circuit reached the same conclusion in Spanski Enterprises, Inc. v.
Telewizja Polska, S.A.133 Defendant TVP, the Polish national television
broadcaster and the author of the 51 programs at issue, posted its own
programs on its own website in Poland on a video-on-demand basis. TVP had
granted Spanski, a Canadian corporation, an exclusive license to perform its
programs in North and South America. Pursuant to an earlier settlement
agreement between the parties, TVP was required to use “geo-blocking” to
prevent the programs on its Polish website from being viewed by viewers in
North and South America.134 Spanski discovered, however, that at least 51
programs were available and could be viewed in the United States and
Canada. Spanski sued, and the district court found that TVP employees had
intentionally disabled the geo-blocking on those programs.135 The D.C.
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling that TVP was “performing” the videos
by transmitting them into the United States.136 TVP protested strenuously that
it could not be held liable under U.S. law because it had acted only in Poland.
The court disagreed:
Here, although it was in Poland that TV Polska uploaded and
digitally formatted the fifty-one episodes, the infringing
performances—and

consequent

violation

of

Spanski’s

copyrights—occurred on the computer screens in the United
States on which the episodes’ images were shown.
Accordingly, because the conduct relevant to the statute’s
focus occurred in the United States, this case involves a
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883 F.3d 904 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 907.
135
Id. at 908.
136
Id. at 910. In holding so, the court relied on American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.,
573 U.S. 431, 441 (2014), which held, in the context of unauthorized Internet
retransmissions, that “both the broadcaster and the viewer of a television program ‘perform,’
because they both show the program’s images and make audible the program’s sounds.”
134
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permissible domestic application of the Copyright Act, even if
other conduct occurred abroad.137
The court also rejected TVP’s argument that the ruling would leave every
Internet user in the world subject to liability in the United States, noting that
many such users would not be subject to personal jurisdiction here.138 Relying
on the finding that TVP had intentionally disabled the geo-blocking in order
to allow its programs to be viewed in the United States, it held that “where a
foreign broadcaster uploads copyrighted content to its website and directs that
content onto a computer screen in the United States at a user’s request, the
broadcaster commits an actionable domestic violation of the Copyright
Act.”139 Other courts have agreed.140
Applying the law of the country in which the broadcast or transmission is
received has one serious drawback: it subjects the broadcaster or transmitting
party to the law of multiple jurisdictions. That means the broadcaster or
transmitting party must employ scrambling or geo-blocking or take other
reasonable efforts to prevent content that may lawfully be performed in one
jurisdiction from being received in a jurisdiction where such performance is

137

Spanski, 883 F.3d at 914 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
Id. at 915-16.
139
Id. at 918; see also id. at 916 (“we need hold only that a foreign broadcaster that, as here,
directs infringing performances into the United States from abroad commits a domestic
violation of the Copyright Act.) (emphasis added).
140
See, e.g., Crunchyroll, Inc. v. Pledge, 2014 WL 1347492, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014)
(defendant that uploaded copyrighted works to YouTube from the United Kingdom, which
“were then made available for viewing around the world, including in the United States,”
was liable because conduct was not “wholly extraterritorial”); Shropshire v. Canning, 809 F.
Supp. 2d 1139, 1145-46 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (although defendant created allegedly infringing
video entirely in Canada, he “allegedly uploaded it to YouTube’s California servers for
display in the United States,” which led “to the subsequent viewing of the video by potentially
thousands in the United States.”); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Miller Features
Syndicate, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 198, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting Canadian licensee’s
extraterritoriality defense because allegedly infringing material was accessible from
computers within the United States).
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unlawful. But the alternative is a “least common denominator” world in which
the country from which the content is uploaded can impose its standards on
other countries where the transmission can be received, even if the content
has not been licensed in those other countries. An acceptable intermediate
position is to apply the law of the country where the broadcast or transmission
is received so long as the transmitting party has “targeted” that country in
some meaningful way (for example, by seeking or accepting subscribers in
that country), so that it is on notice that it will be subject to the laws of that
country.
CONCLUSION
Despite the nominal rule that U.S. copyright law is not “extraterritorial,”
courts in the United States have applied U.S. copyright law to a wide range
of multi-territorial infringement claims. Both importation and exportation of
infringing copies or phonorecords of works are prohibited by statute, and the
distribution right has been interpreted broadly to apply to a foreign seller who
ships infringing goods into the United States. Acts in another country that
contribute to infringement in the United States have been held actionable
under U.S. law. Although mere “authorisation” in the United States that
contributes to infringement occurring entirely in another country is not
actionable, if there is a “predicate act” of infringement in the United States,
courts are willing to award the defendant’s profits resulting from that
infringement, even if those profits were earned overseas. And although courts
are split over whether transmissions originating in the United States must be
received here to be actionable, courts agree that transmissions originating
outside the United States that are received here are actionable under U.S. law,
at least where the defendant intentionally “targeted” those transmissions at
the United States in some way. Taken together, these doctrines afford
copyright owners a wide range of options for applying U.S. copyright law to
multi-territorial infringement claims.
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The United States has a strong interest in regulating conduct that results in a
direct infringement within the territory of the United States. Such claims,
however, should be analysed as claims of contributory infringement, a
doctrine which requires knowledge of the infringing conduct, so that a foreign
party is not subject to liability without knowledge that its conduct will be
judged under U.S. law. Conversely, conduct within the United States that
results in a direct infringement in a foreign country ought to be judged by the
standards of the foreign country’s laws, at least in cases like Subafilms, where
the domestic actor has knowledge that its actions will lead to foreign
distribution. A proper respect for international comity, therefore, suggests that
the United States should eliminate, or drastically limit, the “predicate act”
doctrine. Doing so would not necessarily eliminate the possibility of having
the case resolved in a single forum, but it would help ensure that the interests
of other countries are taken into account when U.S. courts adjudicate multiterritorial infringement claims.

